THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM

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VOLUME 2

The Western Islamic World Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries

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Edited by

MARIBEL FIERRO



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The Western Islamic World
Eleventh to Eighteenth Centuries

Volume 2 of *The New Cambridge History of Islam* is devoted to the history of the western Islamic lands from the political fragmenta tion of the eleventh century to the beginnings of European colo nialism towards the end of the eighteenth century. This volume embraces a vast area from al Andalus and North Africa to Arabia and the lands of the Ottomans. In the first four sections, scholars all leaders in their particular fields chart the rise and fall, and explain the political and religious developments, of the various independent ruling dynasties across the region, including famously the Almohads, the Faṭimids and Mamluks, and, of course, the Ottomans. The final section of this volume explores the commonalities and continuities that united these diverse and geographically disparate communities, through in depth analyses of state formation, conversion, taxation, scholarship and the military.

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THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF

ISLAM

The New Cambridge History of Islam offers a comprehensive history of Islamic civilisation, tracing its development from its beginnings in seventh century Arabia to its wide and varied presence in the globalised world of today. Under the leadership of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Muslim community coalesced from a scattered, desert population and, following his death, emerged from Arabia to conquer an empire which, by the early eighth century, stretched from India in the east to Spain in the west. By the eighteenth century, despite political fragmentation, the Muslim world extended from West Africa to South East Asia. Today, Muslims are also found in significant numbers in Europe and the Americas, and make up about one fifth of the world's population.

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State Formation and Organization

Michael Brett

ministerial elite, initially recruited from the jurists of Anatolia, then drawn by Meḥmed II from the Christian aristocracy of the Balkans; like the janissaries, its members became Muslim in his service, employing Turkish rather than Greek, Persian or Arabic as the spoken and written language of government. Becoming Turks in this way, these soldiers and secretaries were the exact opposite of the Turcomans who provided the cavalry of the regime or continued their raids on the expanding European frontier. But unlike the Iranian servants of the Saljuqs, who had sought to incorporate the dynasty into the state they had created, the incorporation into the dynasty of these recruits from the lands they had conquered enabled the Ottomans to succeed where Niẓām al-Mulk had failed, in binding their disparate dominions into a tighter and tighter union.

The western Mediterranean

In the fourth/tenth century the Maghrib or Muslim west had been divided between two rival patrimonial states, those of the Umayyads in al-Andalus and of the Fāṭimids and their Zīrid viceroys in Ifrīqiya, the former Byzantine province of Africa that comprised eastern Algeria, Tunisia and Tripolitania. They had clashed in northern Morocco and western Algeria, which were fought over by their tribal Berber allies. Overthrown by revolution and invasion in the fifth/eleventh century, both were replaced by city-states until the whole of al-Andalus and North Africa was incorporated by conquest in the Almoravid and Almohad empires. Meanwhile the catalyst for the disintegration of Ifrīqiya, the invasion of the Bedouin Arab tribes of the Banū Hilāl, introduced a third factor into the equation of government in the Maghrib.

The city in the western Islamic world

The factors were not as simple as they appear in the structural analysis of Ibn Khaldūn, in which the difference between the complex but incoherent society of the city and the simple but spirited society of the tribal countryside is bridged by the dynastic state. The reliance of the urban population on the prince for its protection was by no means absolute. While they lacked a municipal constitution, it is clear from the example of Syria that Muslim cities around the Mediterranean, which had grown out of colonies of warriors and merchants, did indeed govern themselves to a greater or lesser degree in the presence or absence of empire. In al-Andalus, the collapse of Umayyad rule at Cordoba in 399/1009 had precipitated the formation of a score of city-states

under princes of various provenance. In North Africa, such states had formed from the very beginning in the lands to the west of Ifrīqiya, where they colonised the routes into the Iberian Peninsula and down to the Sahara. In Ifrīqiya they appeared in the fifth/eleventh century with the disintegration of the Zīrid realm. Like the city-states of Syria, those of al-Andalus and North Africa were suppressed by conquest in the fifth/eleventh and sixth/twelfth centuries; but some survived their incorporation into the Almohad empire to last until the ninth/fifteenth century. Ibn Khaldūn himself was a principal witness to those of his own day, as well as a chronicler of their history from the fifth/eleventh century onwards. Such independence was a natural development out of a well-structured urban society that contributed to its own defence, was governed largely by consent, and was certainly capable of revolt.

Its political character was illustrated by the cities of Ifrīqiya. Of the Syrian trio of prince, *raʾīs* and *qāḍī*, the prince ruled at Mahdiyya, Sfax and Gabes and the *raʾīs* at Tunis, Tripoli and Gafsa down to the middle of the sixth/twelfth century. The *qāḍī* made only a brief appearance alongside the *raʾīs* at Tripoli in the middle of the century, when the princes were the Normans of Sicily. Their attack upon Mahdiyya in 517/1123 had mobilised the citizens in its defence; their subsequent occupation of the coastal cities from Sousse to Tripoli was a critical event which turned on the willingness of the citizens to accept their rule. Under the terms of that occupation, Gabes was left in charge of its prince from the dynasty of the Banū Jāmiʿ, while the internal affairs of Tripoli and Sfax were entrusted to leading citizens. Within a few years, however, the arrangement was overturned by popular revolution led by these erstwhile collaborators, on the eve of the final expulsion of the Normans from Mahdiyya by the Almohads.[27] The importance of such notables for the government of their cities is clear, but so is that of the populace, which was prepared both to submit and to resist. Resistance was not necessarily to the infidel as such; the citizens of Tunis under the native dynasty of the Banū Khurāsān endured a long siege by the Almohads before they capitulated to these champions of Islam. The constitutional issue raised by such behaviour is best examined in the case of those cities which gained or regained their independence after the Almohad conquest.

By the end of the seventh/thirteenth century, under the Ḥafṣids at Tunis, Tripoli was once again governed by a *raʾīs* at the head of a *shūrā* or council. Politically it was divided into factions, which after the expulsion of a Ḥafṣid appointee about 720/1320 generated a struggle between two families, the Banū Ṭāhir and the Banū Thābit at the head of two clans, the Mazūgha and Zakūja. The Banū Thābit won, and by the end of the century had converted

their leadership (*ri'āsa*) into a princedom, ruling over Tripolitania in alliance with the warrior Arabs of the countryside until the city was finally recaptured by the Ḥafṣids in 803/1401.[28] At Biskra, an oasis city on the edge of the desert in eastern Algeria, a similar passage from *shūrā* to *ri'āsa* to petty sultanate took place from the fifth/eleventh to the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century under the Banū Sindī, the Banū Rummān and finally the Banū Muznī, who ruled as clients of the Ḥafṣids in alliance with the warrior Arab Dawāwida, until once again the city came under the rule of Tunis.[29] At Ceuta, the rule of the ʿAzafids followed by the Ḥusaynids displays the same elements of a council of notables and rival families, together with an armed citizenry.[30] The evolution towards hereditary monarchy seems a natural progression towards the norm of the Muslim state, but the element of consent remained. At Tripoli the reimposition of Ḥafṣid rule took place with the approval of its notables, whose representative character continued to be a factor in the constitution of the dynastic state.

Prophecy and empire

The cities of Ifriqīya existed in partnership with the tribes of the Banū Hilāl and Sulaym in the countryside, where the Arabs confronted the native Berber population. At the far end of the Maghrib, the situation was quite different. Out of the conflict between the Zīrids and the Fāṭimids, which had drawn in the Hilalians at the outset of their career in North Africa, came the invasion of the Almoravids (al-Murābiṭūn), Berbers of the western Sahara 'bound together' in the cause of militant Sunnī Islam to make war upon heresy and paganism. However, as John Wansbrough remarked of the Kutāma who brought the Fāṭimids to power in Ifrīqiya in the fourth/tenth century, 'That the propaganda in this particular case should have been Ismāʿīlī is historically, but not phenomenologically, relevant.'[31] The phenomenon was the structural militancy of a tribal society in which self-defence and solidarity were, as Ibn Khaldūn said, the means to survival, and its susceptibility to the call to holy war. Although the propaganda was now in conscious opposition to Ismāʿīlism, the outcome was the same. A struggle for supremacy between rival clans of the Ṣanhāja resulted in the paradoxical conversion of a stateless society into a disciplined community under the dictatorship of the prophetic figure Ibn Yāsīn, which formed an army of conquest. Where the Kutāma had taken over a state, the Almoravids created an empire where none had existed before in the Sahara, Morocco and western Algeria, before recreating the centralised state of al-Andalus. As the empire grew, its government evolved from a theocracy into a centralised monarchy under the dynasty founded after the

death of Ibn Yāsīn by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn. While the Almoravids became a military aristocracy commanded by his relatives, the Banū Turgūt, the rule of the law that they championed came into the hands of the Mālikī jurists, and the administration into those of Andalusi secretaries.

Over such an immense area, however, whose African territories had never before known central or even state government, the rule of the *amīr al-muslimīn* or Commander of the Muslims was thinly stretched. The Sahara reverted to tribalism under a warrior coupled with a clerical elite. In Morocco and western Algeria the administrative infrastructure was lacking to amalgamate a disparate population of townsfolk and tribesmen in mountain and plain into a subject body. Government depended upon control of the cities of the north, notably Fez and Tlemcen, and the oasis city of Sijilmāsa, from the new capital at Marrakesh, via the strategic routes that ran south across the Sahara, east to Ifrīqiya and north into al-Andalus. There the administrative structure existed, but Almoravid rule was only acceptable as a defence against Christian invasion from the north. The Almoravids themselves, unsupported by Turcoman-style immigration from the Sahara, were too few for the task, needing the forces of al-Andalus in the peninsula, Christian mercenaries and black slave soldiers in the Maghrib. Meanwhile the law, which had justified the conquest of the empire by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn after the death of Ibn Yāsīn, became a question of piety on the part of his son and successor ʿAlī, and a distraction from the work of government. A revolution that demonstrated the weakness of the regime was required to preserve its empire and perpetuate its legacy in North Africa.

After the Fāṭimids and the Almoravids, the revolution of the Almohads (al-Muwaḥḥidūn or Unitarians) confirmed Wansbrough's and indeed Ibn Khaldūn's dictum on the structure of tribal society and its susceptibility to the appeal of faith. Like the Almoravids, the Maṣmūda of the High Atlas were transformed into an army under the dictatorship of their prophetic figure Ibn Tūmart, inspired by a doctrine as opposed to the legalism of Ibn Yāsīn as that legalism had been opposed to Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlism. The final product of the Fāṭimid challenge for the headship of Islam, it may have been phenomenologically irrelevant to his success, but was historically important, not only as the occasion for his mission. As a doctrine of the *mahdī*, the emissary of God for the rectification of the world, it set its adherents apart from the mass of the population as a religious as well as ethnic and political elite. At the same time it governed the formation and organisation of their state. Their tribal regiments were led by a combination of the disciples of the Mahdī and the shaykhs of the Maṣmūda, a marriage of religious, political and military authority which was

the strength as well as, ultimately, the weakness of the government they wrested from the Almoravids in the middle of the sixth/twelfth century. It was the disciple and caliph of the Mahdī, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, who led the Almohads to victory and added Ifrīqiya to the empire, and his descendants the Muʾminids who ruled it. But it was the shaykhs who maintained the community and provided the regime with its force. The division was bridged on the one hand by the appointment of shaykhs in the manner of Saljuq atabegs to act as guardians to the princes of the dynasty in their posts as provincial governors. On the other hand, the sons of the shaykhs were recruited by the dynasty as *ṭalaba* or *ḥuffāẓ*, a corps of officer cadets educated as scholars and trained as warriors to staff the administration of the empire.[32]

Mosques and minarets affirmed the supremacy of the doctrine, while city walls ensured defence against the continual threat of rebellion and invasion. At the beginning of the seventh/thirteenth century the appointment of the shaykh Ibn Abī Ḥafṣ as viceroy of Ifrīqiya brought the empire finally under control, only for the disastrous defeat by a Christian coalition at Las Navas de Tolosa in 609/1212 to initiate a struggle for power between the dynasty and the shaykhs. In 627/1230 this culminated in a massacre of the shaykhs by the caliph al-Maʾmūn. With the dialectical conflicts of the past 300 years at an end, no further religious revolution was at hand. Instead the empire disintegrated into Ifrīqiya under the Ḥafṣids, Tlemcen under the ʿAbd al-Wādids, Granada under the Naṣrids, and finally Morocco under the Marīnids. Where the Ḥafṣids were Almohads, the Marīnids like the ʿAbd al-Wādids were drawn from the nomadic Zanāta who had fought for the Umayyads against the Fāṭimids, and now inherited the state of Morocco, the principal creation of the Almoravids and Almohads. From Morocco, the Marīnids dominated the Maghrib for the next hundred years, as they endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to reconstitute the empire. Underlying their failure, however, was the lasting achievement of the Almoravids and Almohads. Where the Romans, from a base at Carthage in the north-east, had divided North Africa between civilisation and barbarism, the barbarians they had excluded, turned state builders by Islam, had unified it from Marrakesh in the south-west, on the far side of the Roman frontier. While the unity did not last, its framework endured in this community of rival states.[33]

Government and people

The royal fortress cities of the Alhambra at Granada, Fās al-Jadīd at Fez, the Mashwar at Tlemcen and the Qaṣba at Tunis housed the dynasty and its personnel, variously split between servants, soldiers and secretaries. The

Ḥafṣids retained the Almohad hierarchy of shaykhs, while the Marīnids followed the Muʾminids in training up the youth of their warrior aristocracy for ministerial rank. The Naṣrids took their viziers from the secretarial class to which Ibn Khaldūn belonged, while importing their warriors from the Zanāta of the Maghrib. Both the Marīnids and the Ḥafṣids employed Christian guards. At Tunis the important position of *ḥājib* or chamberlain in control of the palace might go to an Almohad or to a secretary, at Fez to a confidential servant, perhaps to a jurist. Together, the three classes constituted the army, which in the Circle of Equity ensured the welfare of the subject, provided it was paid for out of taxation. In the compact kingdom of Granada, this may have been relatively straightforward; but in such a diverse region of mountain, steppe and desert as North Africa, the right of the state to tax the subject was hard to exercise, and the management of its finances by the *ṣāḥib al-ashghāl* or master of [the dynasty's] affairs was problematic. Tax-farming was common; otherwise, a community might pay a global sum, collected by occasional or regular expeditions which lived off the land. Much was assigned to the warrior nomads who provided the bulk of the armed forces of each dynasty. Collecting the taxes of their territories, they ruled them on behalf of the state, keeping in check the hill peoples frequently beyond the reach of government. Most prominent were the descendants of the Banū Hilāl, who under the Ḥafṣids and ʿAbd al-Wādids in particular formed an estate of the realm, controlling much of the countryside. Their chiefs belonged to the aristocracy of the regime, in possession of estates whose taxes they enjoyed as rents. If the peasantry remained poor, the cities fared better, their taxes providing the regime with the bulk of its ready money. But the identification of government with tax collection in what came to be called the *makhzan* or 'treasury' state meant that the welfare of the subject was incidental to the maintenance of the regime.

The welfare of the subject nevertheless remained the ideal, put into practice by the redistributive character of the system, in which the wealth of the state gave widespread employment in the households of the great, and found its way into the commercial economy of the city. It was moreover consciously pursued in ways which demonstrated the commitment of the ruler to the community while serving a practical political purpose. The channels were provided by religion, no longer revolutionary or reformist but consensual. Theatrical ceremony was theatrically staged with the building of fortresses, palaces and mosques that not only gave work, but symbolised the power and glory of the faith. With doctrine everywhere back in the hands of the Mālikī schoolmen, the law as administered by the *qāḍī* and explicated by the *muftī*, the

jurist, not only served to regulate the affairs of those within the area of the main cities. By its nature it articulated disputes into which not only the public but the monarch himself might be drawn as the ultimate arbiter.[34] As heirs to the Almohads and their attempt to educate the populace, the Marīnids in particular sought to win over the opinion of that public and reach out to the provinces through the foundation of *madrasa*s, residential colleges that drew in students from the country. And right across the Maghrib the state patronised the *zāwiya*, the residence of the marabout, the *murābiṭ*, who under the influence of Sufism had turned from a holy warrior or militant reformer into a saint who gave his blessing to society. Colonising a countryside overrun by warrior nomads or torn by tribal disputes, the marabout commanded both respect and obedience. His hospitality and protection not only secured the routes, but attracted a following of settlers who gathered around him, a major factor in the reconstitution of rural society. From the point of view of the state, he became an agent of government beyond the competence and often the reach of its army.[35]

The new monarchies

Between *c.* 854/1450 and *c.* 957/1550 the state system that derived from the invasions of the fifth/eleventh century was completely transformed. That transformation coincided with, and was in large measure provoked by, the comparable transformation of the state system of Christian Europe, with the revival of France, the unification of Spain and the formation of the Habsburg empire. Revolution returned to Morocco, but the principal actor in the western Islamic world was the Ottoman empire, which took over Mamlūk Syria and Egypt as well as Iraq before being drawn into the Maghrib by the war with Spain.

The Ottoman empire

Between 886/1481 and 918/1512, the expansionism which had driven the formation of the empire in Anatolia and the Balkans in the eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries gave way to the regularisation of its government. Instead of campaigning in person, Bāyezīd II remained at Istanbul, where the regime of the following century took shape. Like that of the Fāṭimids at the beginning of the period, it retained the basic elements of palace, secretariat, militia and judiciary, but their amalgamation into a single imperial service is a measure of the distance travelled over the intervening centuries of state formation and organisation by the invaders and colonists of

the old Arab and Byzantine empires. That amalgamation was formally accomplished by legislation, which for the first time converted the practice of government into a body of state law, *kanun* (*qānūn*), sc. canon, to stand officially alongside the law of Islam on the authority of the sultan. Like the practice which it endorsed, *kanun* was primarily concerned with taxation and crime, in which respect it separated the servants of the state from its tax-paying subjects, and placed them under a separate jurisdiction as 'the army', whether military or civilian. Its promulgation was then of theoretical as well as practical importance. As a rule of conduct for the army in the Circle of Equity, *kanun* was the instrument of justice, whose reign was the principal justification for a ruler who, unlike the Fāṭimid caliph, could not claim descent from the Prophet.[36] As a definition of that army and its duties, it expressed the subjection of its members to the sultan in exchange for the privilege of office. Membership was assured by recruitment, education and qualification, employment determined by the needs of government.

Through recruitment and employment, the Ottoman empire of the tenth/sixteenth century created a unified system out of the innovations of the past 400 years. From the time of Bāyezīd II, training for ministerial responsibility was combined with slave soldiering when the *devshirme* or Collection of boys from Christian households mainly in the Balkans took not only the place of captives as the source of recruits to the janissaries, but that of the Balkan aristocracy as the source of candidates for high office. The majority intended for the janissaries were qualified by years of manual labour, but the viziers of the future were educated in the palace school in the manner of the Almohad *ṭalaba*. The formation and identification of this newly Muslim, newly Turkish elite with the dynasty was completed by the marriage of those who rose highest in its service into the royal family. Meanwhile the ethnically Turkish cavalry, which formed the bulk of the army, had been converted into a hereditary caste by the allocation of *tīmār*s, the Ottoman version of the *pronoia*, the Byzantine equivalent of the *iqṭāʿ*. Like the Mamlūk *iqṭāʿ*, the *tīmār* itself was not hereditary; but it was allocated by the state on a hereditary basis to the sons of previous cavalrymen. Excluded from these forms of recruitment and their rewards, the Muslim population could enlist in the service of the state through the *madrasa*/*medrese*, which served to qualify its students for entry into the salaried ranks of the teaching profession, the secretariat and the judiciary.

If the graduates of the palace school provided the empire with its high command, it was the secretariat that operated across the whole range of government through the manifold instructions it issued and the voluminous

records it kept. Government itself was divided between the military and the civilian. The former descended from province to *sanjaq* to *tīmār*, which unlike the Egyptian *iqṭāʿ* and that of the Saljuqs of al-Rūm, entitled its holder to collect all the taxes on its land, as well as to punish offences by its peasant cultivators. In return it delivered a large and well-equipped army of horsemen for the continual campaigns of the growing empire. The latter descended through the judiciary to the *qāḍī (kadı*) of each town district, and ascended through the *qāḍīʿasker* (*kadıasker*) or military judge of Anatolia or Rumelia to the high Divan or Council at the apex of the regime. Not only did the *qāḍī* at the base of this hierarchy have jurisdiction over all the inhabitants of his district; he was the local agent who carried out the directives of central government. At the summit, the *qāḍīʿasker*s not only exercised the separate jurisdiction applicable to the army. As members of the Council, they handled the petitions and complaints which had traditionally, in Egypt for example, been dealt with by the vizier or the Mamlūk sultan and his officers. This incorporation of the *qāḍī*, the chief magistrate of the Muslim community, into the administrative apparatus of the state was accompanied by the formal integration of the Islamic law itself into the procedures of government. A parallel hierarchy was established for the *müftī* or jurisconsult who advised on matters of law, headed by a grand mufti to whose opinion the sultan himself felt obliged to defer. In this way an institutional solution was found to the long-standing opposition between religious ideal and governmental practice, one which validated the Ottoman sultan together with the Circle of Equity, sanctioned with the addition of a final formula: 'The holy law orders the state; there is no support for the holy law except through royal authority.'[37]

Conversely, a state organised for war came in this way to operate as a state organised for peace. The state not only lived for war, but lived by war. The tenth/sixteenth century saw the Black Sea encircled, the Iranian world pushed back, and the Arab world added to the empire together with the Maghrib as far as Morocco. The creation of a fleet required a further effort of government to build and man the ships through labour services and conscription arranged by the *qāḍī*. But Egypt in particular was a profitable acquisition, and the difficulty of ruling such a vast dominion was not immediately apparent. Riding this wave of conquest, justice was not only done but seen to be done at Istanbul, where in the second court of the palace of Topkapı the people in the shape of petitioners met with the sultan in the guise of the grand vizier in Council. The theatrical aspect was in evidence in parades and processions, and in the uniforms which graded the ranks of the army below the monarch, the exemplary centre. If taxation and conscription left the

peasantry poor, the civilian sector of the army gave wide employment, while government spending was lavish, trade and manufacturing prospered, and the cities grew in size. As previously in Egypt and Syria, they benefited from pious foundations, which in Ottoman fashion served not only the community, but the practical and ideological purposes of government. The great tomb-mosques of the sultans at Istanbul replicated the *zāwiya* of the Sufi saint, with their hostelries, hospitals and soup kitchens, their Qurʾānic schools and *madrasa*s, all supported by rents from the properties with which they were endowed. They were a powerful statement of the piety as well as the grandeur of the dynasty that represented God on earth, all the more necessary in view of the challenge of Sufism. The sultan himself was affiliated to a Sufi order, as were his janissaries, but complete institutionalisation was impossible. Not only did Sufism represent an alternative form of organisation to the state. Its association with the Safavid enemy in Iran, and its appeal to the Turcomans in Anatolia and the frontiersmen in the Balkans, made it both rebellious and potentially revolutionary.

Morocco

In Morocco, created by the appeal of Islam to the tribes and subsequently the home of maraboutism, Sufism was both rebellious and revolutionary. As in the Ottoman empire, however, it was countered by a different claim to power, that of Sharīfism, based on the claim to descent from the Prophet. By the ninth/fifteenth century this claim had generated a whole population of *sharīf*s, whose hereditary holiness overlapped the hereditary holiness of the marabout and the *ṭarīqa* or way of the Sufi while preserving the distinction of lineage. Its challenge to the legitimacy of the Berber Marīnids culminated in 869/1465 in the execution of the last Marīnid sultan by the *sharīfs* of Fez, who ruled the city until it was recaptured by the Marīnid Waṭṭāsids in 876/1472. This extraordinary demonstration of a city's political capacity, paralleled only by the revolt of the Ifrīqiyan cities against the Normans in the sixth/twelfth century, took place in the context of the Portuguese capture of Ceuta in 818/1415. By the early tenth/sixteenth century the Portuguese had occupied almost all the Atlantic ports as far as Agadir, while, following the extinction of the kingdom of Granada in 897/1492, the Spaniards had occupied cities along the Mediterranean coast as far as Tripoli. The opposition encountered by Spain was that of the corsairs seeking revenge for Granada, which drew the Ottomans into the western Mediterranean. In Morocco, the Portuguese were opposed by the marabouts, either individually or by *ṭarīqa*. Where in the central and eastern Maghrib it was the Ottomans who displaced the

enfeebled ʿAbd al-Wādids and Ḥafṣids, in Morocco such saintly opposition gave rise to an indigenous revolution begun by a *sharīf* from the south. With maraboutic blessing, Muḥammad al-Qāʾim emerged in 915/1510 as the Mahdī destined to revive the fortunes of Islam. Unlike either the Almoravids or the Almohads, he had no specific doctrine, nor a particular tribal following, nor an overriding commitment to holy war, only the charisma to gain the support of the similarly charismatic Jazūliyya brotherhood, and attract recruits to an army equipped with firearms obtained from the Portuguese, Spaniards and Genoese. In 961/1554 his son Muḥammad al-Shaykh finally took possession of Fez to recreate a Moroccan empire. Threatened by its Ottoman and Iberian neighbours and endangered by a disputed succession, this was precariously stabilised for twenty-five years by Aḥmad al-Manṣūr al-Dhahabī following the rout of the Portuguese at al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr in 985/1578.

The name of Saʿdī subsequently given to his dynasty to deny its claim to descent from the Prophet merely emphasises the importance of the claim vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultanate, which lacked this ultimate title to the caliphate. Otherwise, from a capital at Marrakesh where he built himself a palace, Aḥmad al-Manṣūr endeavoured to create an Ottoman-style army with a corps of janissary-style musketeers of largely European origin, and an administration in the hands of ministers who met in regular sessions of the royal Divan. A city of tents took this government on tour around a country imperfectly unified, without a docile peasant but a large tribal population, which lacked the recent tradition of a centralised state. Like its Ottoman exemplar, it was nevertheless intended for further conquest. Marīnid-style expansion to the east was blocked by the Ottomans, but to the south Aḥmad al-Manṣūr imitated the Conquistadors of Spain in the Americas with an expedition to secure the gold of the western Sūdān. His musketeers destroyed the army and the empire of Songhay, but failed to reach the goldfields, and were left to themselves at Timbuktu when Aḥmad died in 1011/1603 and his regime crumbled. Without the institutional strength of the Ottoman empire, it failed to survive the subsequent dispute over the succession. By the middle of the eleventh/seventeenth century the empire had ceased to exist, its place in the south, at Marrakesh and at Fez taken by the great marabouts of the Atlas whom the Saʿdīs had repressed but never exterminated. It was nevertheless recreated at Fez in the 1070s/1660s by *sharīf*s from the south-east, and made permanent by the length of reign of their second sultan Ismāʿīl (r. 1082–1139/1672–1727). With the threat from maraboutism at an end, the triumph of Sharīfism was assured as the necessary qualification for the Moroccan throne. It came, however, at the cost of a government which dispensed with central

administration, relying on the simple expectation of the monarch that he and his household army in the immense palace complex at Meknes would be provisioned by the gifts and services of the men he sent out as governors to live off the land they ruled. By the end of the reign these had formed a series of provincial dynasties, but rebellion was inhibited by the threat of force provided by an army of black slaves and tribal cavalry. This organisation of the state for repression rather than war preserved its empire, but the distinction between a *bilād al-makhzan* or land under tax and a *bilād al-sība* or land 'running to waste', the mountains where collection was difficult or impossible, expressed a reality of government from the time of the Almoravids.

Notwithstanding the rudimentary character of this regime by contrast with that of the Ottomans, by contrast with that of the Saʿdīs it survived thirty years of fighting over the succession to Ismāʿīl. So, after the traumas of the past 300 years, did Fez, whose jurists had remained hostile to the claim of both the Sharīfian dynasties to religious authority on the strength of their ancestry. During the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad (1170–1204/1757–90), they confronted the sultan's construction of the port of Essaouira for trade with Europe. The purpose was fiscal, but the issue much more than an affair of the *makhzan*. The leadership of the community by the Commander of the Faithful was questioned by this breach of a century-old aversion to dealing with the infidel. The argument was won by a scholarly monarch who insisted on a revision of the Mālikī curriculum and attitude to the sources of the law, but its significance was more than theological. If justice was rough and the contract implicit in the Circle of Equity crudely enforced, under the ʿAlawī dynasty a Moroccan community of the faithful had become a reality along with a Moroccan society, formed as the servants of state settled together with the *sharīf*s and greater marabouts into a hereditary aristocracy.[38]

The evolution of the Ottoman empire

By the end of the tenth/sixteenth century the organisation of the Ottoman state for war had reached the limit of its capability to sustain the expansion which had called it into existence. As the wars of conquest came finally to an end, the empire faced the same military and financial problems as the early modern states of its European rivals, and solved them in a similar way. The transformation of army and administration was accompanied by prolonged internal disorder, the loss of territory to Iran, Austria and eventually Russia, and the extensive independence of Egypt and North Africa. It was consequently seen in terms of decline by Ottoman observers who, in the absence of

an alternative vision of the state, called in vain for a return to the standards of the past. Their diagnosis, for which they found support in Ibn Khaldūn, is a commonplace of the modern literature. No more, however, than its western European contemporaries did the state collapse, and its modification is better understood as evolution.

The evolution of the state

The evolution began with the recruitment of a much larger force of infantry musketeers from the Muslim population of Anatolia. Many more thousands strong, the janissaries thus became a corps of free Muslims, joined by still greater numbers of *sekban*, musketeers paid only on campaign. This shifting of the balance away from Rumelia to Anatolia revived the old problem of bringing the Turkish heartland under control. Throughout the eleventh/ seventeenth century disbanded *sekban* regrouped as *jelālī*s, brigands who turned from banditry to rebellion in their demand for janissary status. The janissaries themselves, rioting over pay, meanwhile murdered the sultan ʿOthmān (Osman) II and continued to get rid of the ministers they disliked. Forming an alliance with the bazaar, they went into trade, while tradesmen joined their ranks to make them almost a city militia. The problem of forming a government at Istanbul was compounded by the palace environment in which the princes of the dynasty were raised; providing no sort of education for the sultanate, it was a seat of irresponsible power in the hands of the inner household of women and eunuchs. With the ending of the *devshirme*, however, the ministerial class was more widely recruited, and central government developed socially, with the formation of households and retinues outside the palace. Administratively it followed suit. The grand vizier and his office, eventually installed in a vizieral palace, 'the Sublime Porte', came to take over the direction of the state from the Imperial Council at Topkapı, while the chief scribe at the head of the secretariat rose in importance as head of the administration. Meanwhile the posts of provincial governors were increasingly filled by nominees from the centre rather than from the provincial administration itself.

The provincial level was the level of taxation, where change began with inflation. This wiped out the old cavalry along with the value of the *tīmār*, breaking the original connection between *tīmār*, taxation, military service and government, at the same time that it increased the need of government for cash. Levies that had previously served to finance campaigns now became regular taxes, while others were imposed as required. Collection was centralised through the provincial governor, who in turn relied upon tax-farmers and

wealthy local notables, *aʿyān*, to take from the peasant. Non-Muslims paid their poll-tax through their *millet* or religious community; guilds in the cities were similar agents of the state, while the *qāḍī* continued to function as both judge and local administrator. The significance of the regime lay in the appearance of the *aʿyān* following the allocation of *tīmār*s to courtiers and their clients, the passage of state land into private ownership, and the formation of large estates. In its adjustment to the financial demands of modern warfare, a central organisation for war had by the twelfth/eighteenth century generated a local society organised for peace. Into that society the Ottoman army, still visible in the uniforms pertaining to each rank, blended to form a wider whole.[39]

Syria, Egypt and North Africa

In the Arab provinces, the Ottoman army was an army of occupation, but one whose forces had by the end of the tenth/sixteenth century turned against government from Istanbul. In Syria and Egypt a three-cornered struggle developed as the janissaries and other units found themselves in conflict not only with the governors sent from Istanbul, but with local aspirants to power. In Syria with its mosaic of peoples their competitors were of different origins at different times, and equally opposed to each other; but by the twelfth/eighteenth century these aspirants had come to power by appointment as Ottoman governors rather than forming states of their own. In Egypt the Mamlūks had survived the Ottoman conquest in the capacity of a landholding military aristocracy incorporated into the Ottoman regime as warriors and tax-farmers. Regrouped into great households under hereditary *amīr*s with the Ottoman title of Beg, their factional rivalries effectively prevented the restoration of the Mamlūk sultanate. By the twelfth/eighteenth century they were nevertheless in control of the country, and by its end both they and the Syrians were aspiring to independence.[40]

To the west of Egypt, on the other hand, it was the Ottoman army that took power in the Regencies of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. These were new political units that created the present political division of North Africa from Morocco to Egypt, beginning the formation of the modern states of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria several hundred years before those of the Ottoman Fertile Crescent. With the eviction of the Spaniards and the abolition of the ʿAbd al-Wādids and Ḥafṣids, the janissary forces sent to garrison the cities taken by the corsairs faced only local and uncoordinated opposition from the tribes of the interior. With an end to the overrule of these conquests by the corsair admirals of the Ottoman fleet, these forces then became the effective

power in the new provinces, able to resist the governors sent from Istanbul and restrict the corsairs to their piracy. While never endangering their hold over the country, which increased over time, their internal rivalries nevertheless delayed until the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century the establishment of the Deys at Algiers, and until the twelfth/eighteenth century the foundation of the Qaramānlī and Ḥusaynid dynasties at Tripoli and Tunis. These were formed by the Begs who controlled the country outside the capital as commanders of the cavalry which collected the taxes. In the Regency of Algiers there were three such Begs stationed inland at Mascara, Medea and Constantine, but monarchy at Algiers fell to the Dey, a company officer of the janissaries whom they elected, deposed or assassinated more or less at will.

While the struggle for power was frequently bloody, Ottoman-style armies continued to rule in the name of the sultan on Ottoman lines.[41] Relations with the empire remained close, with janissaries recruited from Anatolia, palace slaves at Tunis acquired from Istanbul, Ḥanafī Turkish jurists to represent the law, and Ottoman-style mosques and palaces. Affairs at Algiers were conducted by weekly council meetings of the principal officers of state; at Tunis households formed around the princes of the royal family. Economically but efficiently, government itself was steadily rebuilt and strengthened after the breakdown of the state in the wars of the tenth/sixteenth century. The cities were well kept, while the tribal interior was held with a minimum of force through alliances with *makhzan* tribes. The army was built into society by marriage, which generated an indigenous population of *quloghlu*s or 'sons of the sultan's slaves', and into the economy by *waqf*. The principal means of investment in the cities, *waqf* was a major factor in urban growth, coupled with the formation of great estates in the settled countryside. From the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century, investment in piracy dwindled, but exports to Europe increased. Here again, an organisation for war was becoming an organisation for peace.[42]

Islam and the state in sub-Saharan Africa

South of the Sahara, there was no tradition of the Oriental state, nor any Arab conquest to establish it. On the evidence of social anthropology, the formation of African kingdoms from the array of stateless societies is attributed to the acquisition of dependants, their organisation to the assimilation of customary chieftaincies into a state structure.[43] Islam nevertheless entered into the process from the fifth/eleventh century onwards, with the growth of Islamic empires in the western and central Sūdān and of Islamic city-states

on the East African coast, followed by the city-states of Hausaland and the sultanates of the eastern Sūdān. The Islam in question is the civilisation of North Africa and the Middle East as it impinged upon sub-Saharan Africa, but its impact has usually been studied in terms of Islamisation, most recently by Levtzion and Pouwels;[44] conceptually this has suffered from the tendency exemplified by Hiskett to measure the result against a definition of Islam as it is supposed to be.[45] The problem has been the lack of adequate evidence from the first few hundred years. The suggestion that the empires of Ghana, Mali and Kanem came into existence to profit from the trans-Saharan trade in gold and slaves, and that the Swahili city-states began as colonies of Muslim merchants, is no longer an acceptable explanation, but points to the importance of the Muslim merchant at the court of the African prince. The meeting of these two very different persons with two very different traditions of government took place on the basis of religion, in which the distinction between scholars and statesmen initially coincided with the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim.

The principle that Muslims outside the *dār al-islām* must continue to live by the law received two expressions in the course of the fifth/eleventh century. On the one hand the Ifrīqiyan jurist al-Qābisī ruled that Muslims living in the pagan Bilād al-Sūdān should elect a *nāẓir*, 'a watchman', to administer the law with the consent of the pagan ruler. Where there was no such ruler, however, the watchman, as in the case of Ibn Yāsīn, the prophetic figure of the Almoravids, became his own enforcer.[46] These two prescriptions, the one for Muslim self-government and the other for Muslim state formation in non-Muslim territory, intertwined in the western and central Sūdān down to the end of the twelfth/eighteenth century. In the fifth/eleventh century, Muslim merchants from the Maghrib lived in their own townships, out of which developed the Muslim cities of Kumbi Ṣāliḥ, Walāta and Timbuktu. Ruled by their *qāḍī*s, these cities became centres for the merchant tribes of the Sahara, whose scholarship, legal and literate, was an instrument of their commerce. From the seventh/thirteenth century these tribes were joined by the Dyula, a Mande people likewise engaged in learning and long-distance trade from a centre at Jenne, who spread across to Hausaland to the east. By the tenth/sixteenth century the Muslims of Timbuktu were sufficiently strong and self-confident to resist the attempts of the Askiyā dynasty of Songhay to rule and tax the city.[47] In the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries, however, the Moroccan conquest of Songhay in 991/1591 freed the Muslims of the western Sūdān from state control, and the scholars of the Fulānī people turned to holy war upon pagans to create their own states.

In the fifth/eleventh century, it is possible that the empire of Kanem in the central Sūdān was taken over by a dynasty of Muslim merchant origin engaged in a trans-Saharan slave trade based on slave raiding. But in its organisation, it conformed to the pattern of the successive empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhay, in which Islam was a creed adopted by indigenous rulers who governed largely pagan subjects in accordance with ancestral belief and custom. Its value in their case was political and economic. Expressed in the ostentatious pilgrimage of Mūsā, Mansa of Mali in the eighth/fourteenth century, Islam was their way into the wider world with which they dealt in slaves, gold and salt, horses, arms and prestigious luxuries. The Muslims who served this purpose, and who supplied their administration with its element of literacy and numeracy, were still frequently expatriates in their own quarters, while the role in that administration of the Sūdānese officers of Islam, the *qāḍī* and the *khaṭīb*, was limited to the court and the Muslim minority. The Askiyās of Songhay were the first to think of ruling by the law of Islam, only to find themselves faced, in their conflict with the jurists of Timbuktu, with the familiar problem of principle versus practice. The situation was in contrast to the position down the eastern side of the continent, where indigenous states or empires were either non-existent, or Christian in the case of Ethiopia, or, in that of Mapungubwe/Great Zimbabwe, too far inland for Muslim settlement. Instead, from at least the fourth/tenth century, Muslim merchants from Egypt and the Gulf had established a close relationship with the village headmen with whom they traded down the coast of the Indian Ocean. The archaeological evidence shows the appearance of mosques at the centre of townships of African type which were progressively rebuilt in stone – a finding consonant with the Bantu syntax but Arabic vocabulary of the Swahili language. This blending of native with Islamic authority gave rise to indigenous Muslim cities under indigenous Muslim dynasties, most notably at Kilwa, whose rulers reinforced their Islamic credentials with a claim to foundation by immigrants from the Gulf. By the eighth/fourteenth century, such rulers were Muslim sultans conducting their affairs in the same way as the Mamlūks. Yet a third kind of state formation had occurred in the Horn of Africa, where Muslim merchants advancing from Zeila up the Rift Valley had created a whole row of states in pagan territory without apparent recourse to holy war until they came into contact with an aggressive Christian Ethiopia. By the ninth/fifteenth century, all had submitted to Ethiopia apart from Adal on the far side of the Rift Valley, whose merchants and rulers were torn between appeasement and jihad.[48]

The political revolution of the tenth/sixteenth century in North Africa and the Middle East, however, was echoed to the south of the Sahara by a parallel

transformation of the political scene. In 999/1591 the build-up of Islamic empire in the western Sūdān was abruptly terminated by the Moroccan invasion which destroyed Songhay a year before the Portuguese occupation of Mombasa completed their control of the city-states of East Africa. Meanwhile in 950/1543, Portuguese fusiliers had enabled the Ethiopians finally to defeat the holy warriors of Adal, which by the end of the century had disintegrated. This collapse of the Islamic state system at either end of the range of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa was meanwhile offset by its development in the central and eastern Sūdān, within the orbit of the Ottoman empire. Unlike the empire of Songhay, the empire of Kanem-Bornu at the end of the tenth/sixteenth century acquired the trained musketeers to re-establish itself as a major power. It was nevertheless unable to annex the walled cities of Hausaland, the capitals of Muslim dynasties in command of armoured cavalry. Such armies were for slave raiding, in the case of Bornu perhaps mainly for the slave trade with the Sahara and the Mediterranean. In the case of the Hausa states, it served primarily to create a productive slave peasant population as well as great households. In both cases, Islam continued to serve the political and economic purpose of relations with the wider world, conducted in large measure through Ottoman Tripoli; the role of the law, served by its scholars, was largely symbolic, though concubinage and the seclusion of upper-class women affected the structure of the household. That was true also of the sultanates of the eastern Sūdān, from the Funj who established themselves on the Nile in the tenth/sixteenth century to the dynasties of Waday and Darfur in the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth. All were African kingdoms involved in the monopoly of trans-Saharan trade with Egypt, which in Waday and Darfur in particular was a trade in slaves. But in their case Islam entered much more systematically into state formation and organisation with the immigration and colonisation of the countryside by maraboutic holy men, many from the Ḥijāz. These were granted land with powers of government, greatly extending the grasp of the state on the population.

This new maraboutism encountered the older tradition of North Africa in the central Sahara at Murzuq in the Fezzan, where the Awlād Muḥammad, a Sharīfian dynasty from Morocco, had been invited to settle the disputes of the population.[49] The previous annexation of the Fezzan by Kanem-Bornu in the seventh–eighth/thirteenth–fourteenth centuries gave the dynasty a strongly Sūdānese character, but for its literacy it too relied upon marabouts to whom it granted land in the oases. In the western Sūdān, on the other hand, the reappearance of pagan kingdoms after the downfall of Songhay had revived

the urgency of al-Qābisī's injunction to the expatriate merchants in the Bilād al-Sūdān to submit to pagan rule. In the eleventh/seventeenth and twelfth/eighteenth centuries the alternative, to follow the example of Ibn Yāsīn and his *murābiṭs*, became increasingly attractive to the Fulānī scholars who turned to the formation of jihadist states in Senegambia over to the west. These in turn led up to the great jihads of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, first and foremost that of ʿUthmān dan Fodio in Hausaland, where the enemy was not paganism but disregard of the law by Muslim rulers. In challenging their right to rule, however, he was going far beyond the situation in West Africa. As scholars like himself became increasingly affiliated to the growing number of Sufi orders that stretched across the Islamic world, the Qādiriyya *ṭarīqa* in the western and central Sūdān had become a school with wide trans-Saharan connections, not least with the Wahhābī movement in Arabia. Its members thus joined in the much wider movement for the Islamic reform of the state which was prompted by the concessions of the Ottoman empire to the new form of paganism represented by the West. While the Ottomans turned towards secularism, rebellion in Arabia, scholarly opposition to the sultan of Morocco, and maraboutic opposition to the Dey of Algiers, signalled the reopening of the confrontation between Islam and the state which the Ottomans in their heyday had so successfully overcome.

Notes

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Chapter 19: State formation and organisation

The subject of state formation and organisation is central to all the histories covered by this volume, which in turn exemplify the various models that have been proposed to describe and rationalise their evolution. Given such a range, it would hardly be practicable to include a full list of suggestions for further reading, and would certainly be redundant in a

volume in which all these histories are fully introduced. The following list of suggestions is accordingly intended in the first place to introduce the history of political thought in Islam as a separate subject, not all of which is relevant to actual practice, and secondly to extend the range of references to the ideology of state formation rather than to state formation and organisation itself.

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Chapter 20: Conversion to Islam: from the 'age of conversions' to the *millet* system

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